For us, by contrast, shadow banking is simply"money market funding of 25 capital market lending", sometimes on the balance sheets of entities called 26 banks and sometimes on other balance sheets. As such, shadow banking is 27 not some troubling excrescence on the healthy body of traditional banking. 28 Rather, it is the centrally important channel of credit for our times, which 29 needs to be understood on its own terms. From this vantage point, the 30 
question of appropriate oversight and regulation requires us to abstract
31 from what we know about traditional banking, and to start instead by 32 imagining a world in which shadow banking is the only banking system. 33 The defining role of markets, both money and capital markets, for our 34 understanding of shadow banking directs attention to the central impor- 35 tance of prices, and also to the central importance of market-making 36 institutions, both for price discovery and for continuing secondary market liquidity. These institutions, relatively unimportant from the perspective of 1 traditional bank loan-based credit, are both central and essential for mod-2 ern capital market-based credit. When they are working well, the whole 3 system works well; and when they stumble, the whole system stumbles. In 4 what follows, we place them at the very center of analytical attention.
5 Figure 1 shows an idealized picture of the shadow banking system, 6 which we might more neutrally call the "market-based credit system". The 7 "capital funding bank" is engaged in money market funding of capital mar-8 ket lending, hence shadow banking, specifically the funding of residential 9 mortgage-backed securities (RMBS). We imagine the risk in these securities 10 being hedged in various swap markets -generically, credit default swaps, 11 interest rate swaps, and foreign exchange swaps -so that the combined 12 CFB asset position is essentially risk-free. 1 We further imagine this asset 13 position being used as security for money market funding.
14 The "asset manager" is the mirror image of the capital funding bank,
15
holding its capital in (secured) money form and enhancing the return on 16 that capital by selective risk exposure in various swap markets -again 1 To avoid possible confusion, let it be noted that we adopt an "insurance" convention of booking swaps that strip out risk as contingent assets on their ultimate owner's balance sheet, and hence also as contingent liabilities on the balance sheet of the counterparty to whom the risk is transferred. An alternative "investment" convention is also possible, which would instead book the risk exposure as an asset on the reasoning that it has positive expected return even if zero net present value at inception.
generically credit default swaps, interest rate swaps, and foreign exchange 1 swaps. Standing in between the asset manager and the capital funding 2 bank are two types of market-makers: one the "global money dealer" whose 3 dealing activities establish the price of funding, and the other the"derivative 4 dealer" whose dealing activities establish the price of risk. These dealers will 5 be the central focus of our analysis. risk which can be stripped out using the institution of the FX swap; the 2009), also known as "shiftability" (Moulton, 1918) .
18
What accounts for the shift from Bagehot's time to our own? The key 19 reason seems to be that in today's world, so many promised payments 20 lie in the distant future, or in another currency. As a consequence, mere 21 guarantee of eventual par payment at maturity does not do much good.
22
On any given day, only a very small fraction of outstanding primary debt 23 is coming due, and in a crisis, the need for current cash can easily exceed it.
24
In such a circumstance, the only way to get cash is to sell an asset, or to use 25 the asset as collateral for borrowing. In the private market, the amount of 26 cash you can get for an asset depends on that asset's current market value.
27
By buying a guarantee of the market value of your assets, in effect you are 28 guaranteeing your access to cash as needed; if no one else will give you cash 29 for them, the guarantor will. 
10
Promises to buy are no good unless you have the wherewithal to make good 11 on them; the weak link in the modern system is the primitive character of 12 our network of promises to buy.
13
Just so, consider the situation of a shadow bank that holds both a risky 14 asset and various swaps that reference that risky asset, and then finances the 15 lot in the wholesale money market, as in Fig. 1 of some well-defined set of prime securities (such as Treasury securities).
But it must also involve commitment to accept as collateral a significantly The contrast with "lender of last resort" is not meant to be a contrast with Bagehot himself, but rather a contrast with the distorted version of Bagehot that has come to dominate our thinking during the intervening century. Under the bank loan-based credit system, emphasis came to be placed entirely on the lending, i.e., funding liquidity, to the neglect of indirect price support of the underlying accepted collateral, i.e., market liquidity. That happened, so it seems, for two historically contingent reasons. First, most often the underlying accepted collateral was a genuine Treasury security so price support seemed irrelevant. Second, when the underlying collateral was something other than a Treasury, it was typically a collection of illiquid loans that had no real market price that could be supported. Given the rise of the shadow banking system, neither of these historically contingent reasons any longer applies.
the instruments that are used to create the prime bills from riskier raw tighter in the former than in the latter. In both cases, observe that dealers invested capital is all held in money form, and risk exposure is achieved 2 using derivatives (Mehrling, 2012) . It is this order flow that created condi-3 tions favorable for the expansion of shadow banking.
4
In expansion mode, the inventory pressure on dealers is readily taken off 5 by expansion of the private profit-seeking market-based credit system. But The fact that some of the quasi-T-bills turned out to be less than prime inevitably cast doubt on all of them. Sloppy, or even fraudulent, underwriting during the boom thus exacerbated the downturn when it inevitably came. b1802-ch05 1st Reading page 83
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1
The second line represents the excess inventory of the derivative dealers. difference, however, is that the asset manager demand was funded by private 5 capital, whereas central bank demand is funded by reserve expansion. to increased demand for money balances.
31
The "boom" character of the resulting expansion is simply the shadow Treasury bills but also the risky assets they finance become unusually liq-6 uid. The consequence is credit inflation, and a boom in the real economy 7 as well.
8
Of course, even at the peak of the boom, government-issued Treasury plummeted, taking with it real economic activity.
32

Conclusion
33
The rise of the market-based credit system can be seen as the rise of a
34
(largely) private credit system alongside the existing (largely) public credit 
